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The Supreme Court has made clear how it expects courts to 
analyze the presumption against extraterritoriality as applied to federal 
statutes.1 Through a two-step framework first articulated in Morrison 
v. National Australian Bank,2 judges at step one look for a “clear 
indication” of congressional intent that the statute applies 
extraterritorially.3 If no such intent is found (meaning the presumption 
is not rebutted), at step two the judge asks “whether the case involves 
a domestic application of the statute.”4 Answering that question 
requires identifying the statute’s “focus” and then determining whether 
the case’s connections to the United States match that focus.5 This two-
step inquiry has generated substantial commentary, much of it critical. 
But what if, at step one, the presumption is rebutted? How far do 
extraterritorial statutes reach? 
On this question the Supreme Court has not provided similarly 
clear guidance.6 The closest the Court has come to an answer is 
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., in which the Court 
explained that it “ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This essay has greatly benefitted from 
the generous comments provided by the participants of this symposium, as well as the 
participants of the Private International Law Workshop at the University of North Carolina 
School of Law. 
1.  For a recent summary of the framework for analyzing the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, see WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 
(2018). 
2.  561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
3.  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016); see also Morrison, 
561 U.S. at 255.  
4.  RJR Nabisco, 16 S. Ct. at 2101; see also Morrison, 561 U.S. 566-67 n. 9.  
5.  See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. 
6.  See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (acknowledging that Morrison left this question 
unaddressed). 
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nations.”7 The Court was perhaps purposefully vague, however, when 
it came to what “unreasonable interference” might mean, even as it 
rejected “case by case” abstention as “too complex to prove 
workable.”8 Nor have the lower courts settled on an answer. Reflecting 
this uncertainty, the new Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States acknowledges in section 405 that there may 
be a limit on the reach of an extraterritorial statute without settling on 
how that limit should be determined (beyond categorizing it as an act 
of statutory interpretation).9 
This essay explores the Empagran “gap” in the Court’s—and thus 
the Restatement (Fourth)’s—treatment of extraterritorial federal 
statutes. It argues that the Restatement (Fourth)’s collection of 
statutory interpretation tools is insufficient to address fully the reach of 
extraterritorial federal statutes. Further, the current indeterminacy of 
this analysis carries costs in terms of possible doctrinal distortion. What 
the gap calls for is a conflicts of law analysis focused on the question 
of priority, which is effectively what the lower courts have been doing. 
But explicitly adopting a conflicts of law approach raises its own 
challenges, ones that are potentially surmountable but will require 
significant work. The essay thus concludes on an imperfect but 
pragmatic note, mirroring the Restatement (Fourth)’s embrace of 
constructive ambiguity to suggest how the gap might be narrowed, even 
if not completely resolved. 
I. THE EMPAGRAN GAP 
 The new Restatement (Fourth) treats prescriptive comity purely 
as a matter of statutory interpretation.10 In particular, it collects a series 
of interpretive tools for identifying the geographic scope of federal 
statutes. First, the presumption against extraterritoriality limits the 
application of federal statutes to U.S. territory “unless there is a clear 
indication of congressional intent to the contrary.”11 Second, if there is 
 
7.  542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (emphasis added). 
8.  Id. at 168. 
9.  See infra note 19. 
10.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402(3) & cmt. 1 & rep. n.12 (AM. LAW INST. 2018); see also Hannah L. 
Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope of State Law in Interstate and International 
Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) and on the Role of Party Autonomy, 27 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381, 395-96 (2017).  
11.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 404. 
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such a clear indication, the outer reach of the statute is circumscribed 
by the Charming Betsy12 canon, under which judges presume that 
Congress did not mean to extend U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction beyond 
the bases recognized by international law (at least absent clear language 
to the contrary).13 In practice, however, Charming Betsy does not 
provide much of a limit as the bases of prescriptive jurisdiction under 
international law are extremely permissive.14 Third, if the statute so 
construed conflicts directly with a foreign statute, such that a person 
acting in good faith to avoid the conflict is nonetheless likely to be 
sanctioned by one country for obeying the laws of another, a judge may 
have discretion to excuse such a violation or reduce the sanctions 
applied.15 However, according to the Restatement (Fourth), that 
discretion is derived from statutory text;16 it is not a free-standing 
defense created by either federal or international law.17 
These tools of statutory interpretation still allow significant space 
for concurrent jurisdiction, or circumstances in which a dispute covered 
by a U.S. statute will also fall under the jurisdiction of another country. 
Often concurrent jurisdiction is not a problem. But in some cases, the 
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction may create friction with other countries 
whose jurisdiction is also implicated. Other times, the dispute may 
seem too far removed from U.S. interests to have merited congressional 
attention; the “literal catholicity” of some statutes, to adopt Justice 
Jackson’s phrase, requires some limiting principle.18 This is what 
Empagran’s “unreasonable interference” consideration attempts to 
provide. The Restatement (Fourth) has generalized Empagran into a 
“principle of statutory interpretation” that allows U.S. courts to 
“interpret federal statutory provisions to include other limitations on 
their applicability” beyond the presumption against extraterritoriality.19 
 
12.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
13.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 406. 
14.  But see William S. Dodge, Reasonableness in the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign 
Relations Law, 55 WILLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2020) (stressing the requirement 
under international law of a reasonable link to justify the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction). 
15.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 442. 
16.  Id. § 442 cmt. d (“Each regulatory regime must be assessed based on its particular 
attributes, and in particular based on the text, structure, and history of the law in question.”). 
17.  See id. § 442 cmt. a.  
18.  Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576 (1953). 
19.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 405 (“As a matter of prescriptive comity, courts in the United States may interpret federal 
2020] MINDING THE EMPAGRAN GAP 507 
 
Relying on Empagran and the new section 405 to manage 
concurrent jurisdiction as a matter of statutory interpretation, however, 
introduces two complications. First, the idea of “unreasonable 
interference” is underdefined. As the Restatement (Fourth) 
acknowledges, the lower courts have by necessity developed additional 
analytical frameworks to implement this general directive, but those 
frameworks vary by circuit and by statute.20 Thus, section 405 is 
worded even more generally than Empagran, simply recognizing the 
possibility of “other limitations” on federal statutes’ applicability. 
A saving grace is the Restatement (Fourth)’s acknowledgment 
that administrative agencies may step in to fill this gap by providing 
interpretations of the geographic scope of federal statutes.21 These 
agency interpretations, which would merit Chevron deference, may 
better reflect the legitimate sovereign interests of other states based in 
part on agency coordination with foreign peers.22 But for statutes for 
which federal agencies have not adopted such a limiting construction, 
the challenge of implementing Empagran and section 405’s broad 
mandate remains. 
Second, and more fundamentally, there is a mismatch between the 
generality of statutory interpretation and the context-specific nature of 
an “unreasonable interference” inquiry. Determining what counts as 
“unreasonable interference” with the interests of other states would 
seem to call for identifying and weighing those foreign interests. But 
the interests of other states are not interchangeable. Treating 
“unreasonable interference” as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
then, risks elevating and locking in the interests of some states over the 
(potentially contrary) interests of other states.23 Or put another way, it 
is difficult at the wholesale level required by statutory interpretation to 
figure out what will count as “unreasonable interference” with other 
 
statutory provisions to include other limitations on their applicability.”); see also id. cmt. a 
(linking § 405 to Empagran and noting that “[r]easonableness is a principle of statutory 
interpretation . . . It operates in conjunction with other principles of statutory interpretation.”). 
20.  See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 405 rep. n.4 (collecting cases). 
21.  Id. § 405 rep. n.1. 
22.  See William S. Dodge, Chevron Deference and Extraterritorial Regulation, 95 N.C. 
L. Rev. 911, 944-48 (2017).  
23.  See Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory 
Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 533 (David Sloss et al. eds., 2011) 
(critiquing Empagran for elevating the interests of foreign state amici over the interests of the 
foreign states actually affected by the challenged conduct). 
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states’ interests, or whose “legitimate sovereign interests” are at stake. 
These challenges of uncertainty and generality may be 
encouraging judges to avoid the question of extraterritorial reach 
altogether, avoidance that can in turn distort other inquiries. One option 
for avoiding the Empagran gap is to rely more heavily on doctrines of 
adjudicatory comity, which allow judges to voluntarily decline their 
jurisdiction on the belief that foreign courts are better suited to resolve 
a particular dispute. I have elsewhere explained my concerns, however, 
about overreliance on doctrines like forum non conveniens and 
international comity abstention.24 Because these doctrines involve 
declining to exercise congressionally granted jurisdiction, they should 
be used sparingly and as a last resort. But the broad framing of such 
inquiries (in conjunction with the Empagran gap) instead invites their 
over-application.25 
Another option for avoiding the gap is to lean more heavily on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.26 This extra reliance on the 
presumption can take two different forms, both of which are 
problematic. First, courts might apply Morrison step one vigorously to 
interpret a federal statute as not applying extraterritorially. This is 
arguably what the Supreme Court itself did in RJR Nabisco v. 
European Community,27 when it acknowledged that RICO’s 
substantive provisions apply extraterritorially but avoided having to 
articulate limits to that extraterritorial reach by instead re-applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality separately to RICO’s provision 
for civil remedies (and concluding that the remedial provision did not 
rebut the presumption).28 
Second, courts might skip directly to Morrison step two and assert 
that regardless of potential geographic scope, the application of the 
 
24.  See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390 (2017); 
Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Border, 105 VA. L. REV. 63 (2019).  
25.  See generally Gardner, Abstention at the Border, supra note 24 (developing this 
argument). 
26.  See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Extraterritoriality in the Public and Private Enforcement 
of U.S. Regulatory Law, in THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND ITS CHALLENGES (Franco Ferrari & Diego P. Fernandez Arroyo eds., forthcoming Dec. 
2019); Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 134 
(2016).  
27.  136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).  
28.  For further development of this analysis, including a critique of the majority’s 
interpretation of that remedial provision, see Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 
supra note 26. A similar argument could be made regarding the Court’s application of the 
presumption in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
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statute in the present case would be domestic. In WesternGeco LLC v. 
ION Geophysical Corp.,29 for example, the Court avoided a difficult 
question about the potentially global reach of U.S. patent remedies by 
jumping to step two and concluding that the infringement at issue was 
a domestic act.30 This move is pragmatic in the short run, but it puts 
greater weight on the “focus” inquiry in the long run—an inquiry that 
is already showing signs of strain. As Professor Aaron Simowitz has 
argued, identifying the “focus” of a statute may sound objective, but it 
is a formalism that like all formalisms devolves into malleable 
decisions: How broadly or narrowly should the focus be defined? Can 
a statute have more than one “focus”? What if the focus is intangible 
and thus not located in any physical space?31 
In addition to these practical problems, both avoidance moves—
the turn to adjudicatory comity to decline congressionally granted 
jurisdiction and the application of formalistic fictions to constrain 
federal statutes—also make it harder for Congress, when it does want 
particular laws to apply to persons or conduct outside of U.S. territory, 
to effectuate that intent. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have 
ratcheted up how much Congress must say and how clearly it must say 
it before its laws will be allowed to have extraterritorial effect.32 And 
even if Congress does speak with surpassing clarity, the federal courts 
may nonetheless assert the power to decline to hear those disputes as a 
matter of judicial discretion.33 
At the very least, it seems unlikely that section 405 will reduce 
federal courts’ reliance on the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
To the contrary, the vagueness of section 405 makes it more likely that 
judicial reliance on the presumption against extraterritoriality will 
continue to expand. As a result, and despite the reporters’ 
admonishment to not “double-count” foreign state interests in this 
way,34 section 405 may become the proverbial second bite at the apple 
for judges and litigants seeking to end troublesome cases. 
 
 
29.  138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). 
30.  Id. at 2136, 2138. 
31.  See Aaron D. Simowitz, The Extraterritoriality Formalisms, 51 CONN. L. REV. ___ 
(forthcoming 2019) (raising these and similar questions). 
32.  See, e.g., Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, supra note 26, at 141-43. 
33.  See Gardner, Abstention at the Border, supra note 25, at 81-90. 
34.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 405 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
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II. THE IRREPRESSIBLE RELEVANCE OF CONFLICTS OF LAW 
Lurking behind the Empagran gap is a long-running debate over 
the role of conflicts of law in the application of extraterritorial federal 
statutes.35 To borrow the framing of the draft Restatement (Third) of 
Conflicts of Laws, the Empagran gap represents the pivot point 
between the question of scope and the question of priority. The first 
question asks which states’ laws apply to the given conduct (“scope”), 
while the second asks which of those laws should take precedence 
(“priority”).36 The draft Restatement (Third) proposes that the question 
of scope can properly be thought of as a matter of statutory 
interpretation.37 That matches the approach of the Restatement (Fourth) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding questions 
of prescriptive comity. The Restatement (Fourth) self-consciously 
frames those questions as limited to tools of statutory interpretation and 
as focused on the “geographic scope” of federal laws. 
But the question of “unreasonable interference” with the interests 
of other nations starts to feel like a question of priority—of when U.S. 
law should give way to the regulatory authority of other sovereigns. 
Indeed, Empagran’s “unreasonable interference” principle was 
adapted from conflicts of law analysis. In articulating this principle, 
Empagran cited to admiralty cases like Lauritzen v. Larsen that framed 
their analysis in terms of conflicts of law.38 It also cited to section 403 
of The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States,39 which proposed that states “may not exercise jurisdiction to 
prescribe law . . . when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
unreasonable.”40 Although section 403 categorized “unreasonableness” 
as a question of jurisdictional scope, its multifactor balancing test 
reflected the balancing tests developed by the appellate courts in cases 
 
35.  See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An 
Argument for Judicial Unilaterlism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 103-04 & nn.12-13 (1998) 
(collecting authorities on both sides of this debate). 
36.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 5, topic 1 introductory note 
(p.111) (Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 10, 2017). This view is still controversial, but the distinction 
is helpful for present purposes. 
37.  Id. at 113; see also id. § 5.01 cmt. c. 
38.  See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (citing 
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963); 
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959); and Lauritzen v. Larsen, 
345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953)). 
39.  Id. 
40.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
403(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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like Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.41 Timberlane’s 
factors, in turn, were also drawn from conflicts of law considerations, 
including the “[b]alancing of foreign interests” involved in Lauritzen.42 
Even while Empagran rejected the case-by-case balancing of conflicts 
of law analysis, then, its guidance (such as it was) was derived from 
conflicts of law inquiries. 
Nor is Empagran the only time the Court has transformed 
conflicts of law considerations into tools of statutory interpretation. 
The modern presumption against extraterritoriality is itself rooted in 
conflicts of law. Multiple scholars have traced how the presumption 
against extraterritoriality initially reflected Beale-ian conceptions of 
strict territoriality during the era of the Restatement (First) of Conflicts 
of Law.43 Following the choice-of-law revolution, which 
acknowledged state interests in regulating extraterritorial conduct and 
thus interred a territorially-limited conception of choice of law, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality fell out of use. When it was 
resurrected by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian 
American Oil Co. (Aramco),44 the Supreme Court combined the “old” 
presumption (“whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be 
ascertained”45) with language from admiralty cases like Lauritzen that 
had addressed conflicts of law considerations more forthrightly. Thus, 
Aramco required an “affirmative intention of the Congress clearly 
expressed” before a statute could be construed to apply 
extraterritorially,46 a conflation of doctrines that has justified the 
subsequent evolution of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
towards a clear statement rule.47 
This pattern of transforming conflicts of law questions into 
questions of statutory interpretation may reflect the uneasy status of 
conflicts of law for federal statutes, as Caleb Nelson has suggested.48 
 
41.  549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
42.  See id. at 613. 
43.  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction between Statutes 
and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 660–61 (2013); see also id. at 661 n. 13 (collecting 
other scholars to similar effect).  
44.  499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
45.  See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (emphasis added)). 
46.  Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)) 
(emphasis added). 
47.  See Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, supra note 25, at 136-37 
(developing this argument). 
48.  See Nelson, supra note 43. 
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Articulating a federal doctrine for conflicts of law would require 
grappling with difficult Erie questions49 and creating federal common 
law, both of which make judges uneasy. Nelson thus argues that 
locating choice-of-law inquiries within individual federal statutes (i.e., 
by transforming them into tools of statutory interpretation) has allowed 
federal judges to disclaim judicial lawmaking power while ensuring 
that such determinations remain matters of federal law.50 
Beyond this concern for federal judicial lawmaking, the Supreme 
Court has expressed concern about the unpredictability of balancing 
tests like those proposed by section 403 and Timberlane.51 This concern 
is in part a question of institutional capacity: are judges capable of 
identifying and weighing the interests of different governments? I have 
myself expressed doubts as to which factors in such balancing tests 
judges can reliably ascertain.52 There is also an imperfect fit between 
conflicts of law analysis, which is designed for disputes between 
private litigants, and the public law nature of most federal statutes that 
apply extraterritorially.53 In the private law realm, choice of law 
analysis is used to identify the one “right” law to apply to a dispute; in 
the public law realm, in contrast, concurrent jurisdiction means that 
more than one sovereign’s law may legitimately be applicable. 
For all these reasons, adopting an explicit conflicts of laws 
framework for analyzing the Empagran gap may not be an ideal 
solution. But neither is pretending that the consideration of foreign 
sovereign interests can be addressed at the level of generality required 
by statutory interpretation—or avoiding the problem altogether 
through vaguely defined exercises of abstention. 
III. IMPERFECT OPTIONS 
In the absence of clearer guidance, the courts of appeal have been 
 
49.  In particular, the Supreme Court has long held that state law applies to conflicts of 
law questions when federal courts are applying state substantive law. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see also Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 
3 (1975) (applying Klaxon to a case applying state law to foreign conduct). 
50.  See Nelson, supra note 43, at 662-63, 727. 
51.  See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004). 
52.  See, e.g., Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941, 1006-09 
(2017). 
53.  I thank Jim Nafziger and Bill Dodge for pointing out this problem of mismatch 
between private and public law frameworks. See also Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-
of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, supra note 35 (comparing unilateral 
and multilateral approaches to choice of law for public laws). 
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using both statutory interpretation and abstention to address the 
Empagran gap. In the context of antitrust claims, for example, the 
Second Circuit has framed the question as one of abstention, but has 
invoked the balancing tests of Timberlane and Mannington Mills, Inc. 
v. Congoleum Corp.54 to analyze it.55 In addressing Lanham Act claims, 
meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit has framed the question as one of 
statutory interpretation, though it also analyzed the question through 
Timberlane’s balancing test.56 And some federal courts have more 
forthrightly invoked federal common law to resolve conflicts of law 
questions in transnational cases, especially when those cases involve 
federal questions.57 Indeed, the lower courts continue to invoke 
Timberlane and section 403 factors to address the Empagran gap, 
regardless of how the inquiry is framed in doctrinal terms.58 
For its part, the Restatement (Fourth) clearly rejects abstention 
and embraces statutory interpretation as the right doctrinal home for 
this inquiry.59 But in doing so, it eschews a balancing test approach. 
This effectively ends the analysis for federal statutes with the question 
of scope: if a claim falls within the scope of the statute, then the statute 
should be applied. While this approach solves the analytical messiness 
of bringing conflicts analysis in through the backdoor, it is itself a rule 
of priority in the form of a unilateral approach to conflicts.60 That 
choice of priority rule should be identified and defended as such 
because of the signal it sends to judges. The current signal being sent 
is precisely the opposite: that judges should be wary of applying 
 
54.  595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). 
55.  See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. (In re Vitamin C Antitrust 
Litig.) 837 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Animal Sci. Prods., 
Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018). 
56.  See Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 969, 972-75 (9th Cir. 2016). 
57.  See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 794-95 (5th ed. 2011) (gathering cases).  
58.  See also French v. Liebmann (In re French) 440 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(applying § 403 to determine whether “the application of foreign law may be more appropriate 
than the application of our own law” in the context of bankruptcy). 
59.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 405 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Reasonableness is a principle of statutory interpretation 
and not a discretionary judicial authority to decline to apply federal law. It operates in 
conjunction with other principles of statutory interpretation. When the intent of Congress to 
apply a particular provision is clear, a court must apply that provision even if doing so would 
interfere with the sovereign authority of other states.”). 
60.  Cf. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial 
Unilateralism, supra note 35, at 104 (noting that “the central question” is not “whether conflicts 
theory should be applied to questions of extraterritoriality, but rather which conflicts theory 
should be applied” and arguing for a unilateral approach). 
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statutes extraterritorially.61 Explicitly identifying and justifying a 
unilateral rule of priority would reassure federal judges that 
extraterritorial statutes should indeed be applied extraterritorially. 
One option would thus be to follow the Restatement (Fourth)’s 
lead to its logical end by articulating a rule of priority that does not 
defer to other states’ interests and thus does not require a balancing test. 
The difficulty with this approach is that it will necessitate some 
abstention, given that judges will not always be comfortable applying 
extraterritorial statutes so broadly. For example, federal judges might 
invoke abstention to defer to parallel proceedings in other countries or 
to executive branch intervention.62 But to prevent the exceptions from 
swallowing the rule, the grounds for abstention must be carefully 
cabined. 
Another option would be to embrace a limited federal common 
law of conflicts of law, at least for transnational cases involving federal 
questions.63 The analysis need not be open-ended balancing (as in 
Lauritzen). Instead it might start with a strong default in favor of 
applying extraterritorial federal statutes extraterritorially. Factors 
currently used in balancing tests like Timberlane and section 403 might 
then be simplified and refined. Fewer factors and factors focused on 
judicially ascertainable facts will be easier to assess and thus result in 
more predictable outcomes.64 To take a few examples, the Timberlane 
factor of the “nationality of parties and location of businesses” is both 
relatively easy to ascertain and bears directly on the strength of U.S. 
interest in the dispute. The “degree of conflict with foreign law,” in 
contrast, is harder to apply and overlaps with other comity-based 
doctrines like act of state and foreign compulsion defenses (indeed, this 
factor is in some tension with the Supreme Court’s holding in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California65). The Ninth Circuit has recently 
suggested that the “degree of conflict with foreign law” actually relates 
to whether there is an ongoing proceeding abroad,66 but that 
 
61.  See for example the discussion of RJR Nabisco and WesternGeco above. 
62.  See Gardner, Abstention at the Border, supra note 25, at 110-25 (outlining possible 
grounds for abstention in transnational cases, though stressing the need to cabin these grounds 
carefully and expressing some doubt as to the feasibility of abstention based on executive branch 
deference). 
63.  See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 57, at 794 (gathering authorities exploring this 
possibility). 
64.  See Gardner, Parochial Procedure, supra note 52, at 1006-09 (discussing how to 
design decision-making frameworks when complex systemic interests are at stake). 
65.  509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
66.  See Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 973 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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consideration is better addressed through a comity-based doctrine 
keyed more explicitly to foreign parallel proceedings.67 The impulse 
behind this factor, in other words, might be better served through other 
tools. More generally, the retained factors should focus on the 
significance of U.S. interests rather than a comparison across 
jurisdictions: if there is more than a tenuous connection to the United 
States, the court should hew to the strong presumption that an 
extraterritorial law should apply extraterritorially. 
Adopting a conflicts of law approach to the Empagran gap would 
have the benefit of matching judicial intuition as to what sort of 
analysis the gap requires. It is also more sensitive to context (as 
compared to statutory interpretation), which could reduce the impetus 
for judges to resort to backdoor functionalism. But under either 
approach—statutory interpretation paired with limited abstention or a 
simplified conflicts of law analysis—the solution should embrace some 
imprecision at the margin. If the analysis allows a few too many (or a 
few too few) cases to go forward in U.S. courts, that over- or under-
inclusion may be a small and acceptable cost to pay for the consistency 
and ease of application gained by adopting a more rule-like approach 
to the Empagran gap. The stakes for any one case, in other words, are 
not so high as to make precise calibration a requirement.68 
Regardless of the label applied by courts or the Restatement, the 
Empagran gap reflects a question of conflicts of law that is in search 
of a sensible analytical home. Confronting the issue of priority 
directly—whether through statutory interpretation or a conflicts of law 
framework—may make judicial analysis of the Empagran gap more 




67.  The federal courts currently analyze this question sometimes via forum non 
conveniens and sometimes under the label of international comity abstention. I have argued that 
it merits its own explicit and carefully formulated abstention-like doctrine. See Gardner, 
Abstention at the Border, supra note 25, at 116-20. 
68.  Cf. Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 24, at 427-29 (analyzing 
the trade-off between simpler decision-making rubrics, on the one hand, and precise 
jurisdictional calibration, on the other). 
